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Abstract 
 
Long waiting times for inpatient treatment in the UK National Health Service have long been a 
source of great popular and political concern, and therefore a target for policy initiatives.  One 
such is the London Patient Choice Project, under which patients at risk of breaching inpatient 
waiting time targets were offered the choice of an alternative hospital with a guaranteed 
shorter wait.  This paper uses a difference in difference econometric methodology to infer the 
impact of the choice project on ophthalmology waiting times. In line with our theoretical 
predictions, it finds that the project led to lower average waiting times in the London region 
and a convergence in waiting times amongst London hospitals.   
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 The policy background 
 
The bulk of UK health care is delivered by the National Health Service (NHS), funded out of 
general taxation, with primary and secondary care largely free of direct charges to patients.  
Almost all citizens are registered with an NHS general practitioner (GP) and - apart from those 
admitted through accident and emergency units - no patient can be seen by an NHS 
specialist without being referred by a GP.  The GP is a gatekeeper for non-emergency 
(elective) secondary care, and has also had a dominant role in determining which specialist a 
patient will see, and therefore which hospital she will be treated in.  Once a referral has been 
made, there have historically been long delays for patients awaiting a first visit to an 
outpatient department, and subsequently for those awaiting inpatient treatment.  For example, 
in 2000 the mean waiting time in England for a first outpatient appointment for ophthalmology 
patients was 11.7 weeks, and for subsequent inpatient admission an additional 27.6 weeks. 
 
The waiting times for elective inpatient surgery have as a result been a highly politically 
charged feature of the English NHS (Yates, 1987; 1995).  In 2000 the national government 
set a target of a maximum inpatient waiting time, measured from the time a specialist advised 
treatment was necessary to receipt of the treatment, of 15 months by March 2002, of twelve 
months by March 2003, and of three months by the end of 2008. Targets for waits for a first 
appointment with the specialist were also set (although delays for diagnostic tests were not 
included) (Department of Health, 2000).  Subsequently, an even more ambitious target of 
eighteen weeks maximum has been set for the period from an initial referral to a hospital 
specialist to eventual treatment (HM Treasury, 2004).  Numerous initiatives have been 
introduced in pursuit of these objectives, including London Patient Choice Project (LPCP), the 
subject of this paper. 
 
 
1.2 The London Patient Choice Project 
 
The London Patient Choice Project offered some patients awaiting elective surgery some 
element of choice over when and where they received treatment.  If they were awaiting 
inpatient treatment at a participating London hospital, and were in danger of breaching the 6 
month waiting time target, they offered the patient the choice of being treated in her current 
hospital, or of receiving treatment with a guaranteed shorter wait at one of two alternative 
providers.      
 
London hospitals could participate in the LPCP as “exporters” (whose patients could be 
offered choice of treatment elsewhere), or as “importers” who treated the patients referred 
from exporters.  Alternatively, hospitals could decide not to participate as either exporters or 
importers. The LPCP management team was provided with a budget directly from the national 
ministry to purchase operations at fixed price per patient from designated importers, in the 
form of existing hospitals or new providers known as Treatment Centres. (Treatment Centres 
are similar to Single Specialty Hospitals in the US, and differ from standard public hospitals in 
that they do not accept emergency admissions.)  Note that the LPCP budget was not taken 
directly from the existing budgets of London hospitals, so the Project implied an increase in 
the total supply of surgical capacity in London.  Exporting hospitals supplied the LPCP team 
with the names of London resident patients expected to breach the six month target waiting 
time. Each patient was then contacted by the LPCP team and offered an agreed date for 
admission at an importer.   
 
All London NHS hospitals were subject to the national performance ratings regime, which 
gave managers a very strong incentive to adhere to the challenging waiting time targets 
(Smith, 2005).  A hospital with long waiting times therefore had an incentive to join LPCP as 
an exporter in order to meet waiting time targets, since its exported patients had shorter 
waiting times.  Moreover, it did not directly lose income by exporting patients. A hospital with 
short waiting times had a direct financial incentive to participate as an importer, so long as its 
own waiting time performance was not adversely affected.  
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The LPCP was applied first to ophthalmology from October 2002, covering about two thirds of 
all procedures in the speciality. The initiative was extended to orthopaedics, ENT and general 
surgery during April 2003 and to a number of other routine acute procedures later in 2003.  By 
June 2004, 22,500 patients had been offered choice and 15,000 (66%) had accepted 
treatment at another hospital (Dawson et al, 2004).  Of the 20 London NHS hospitals 
providing ophthalmology services, 10 were exporters, 4 were importers and 6 chose not to 
participate.  79% of patients exercising choice were treated at treatment centres.  
 
The LPCP offers an opportunity to examine the impact on waiting times of offering a greater 
degree of choice to hospital patients within a planned health system.  In contrast to many 
NHS initiatives, it applied only to one region of England, and so its impact can be assessed by 
using careful comparison with other parts of the country.  This paper therefore uses 
econometric methods to examine the impact of LPCP on the levels and distribution of 
ophthalmology waiting times in London.  It is part of a larger project that examined the 
system-wide impact of the LPCP (Dawson et al, 2004).  We first present a theoretical model 
that captures the main aspects of patient choice relevant to this study.  We then present our 
data sources and empirical methods.  Results for the ophthalmology specialty are then 
presented.  Finally, some implications for policy are drawn. 
 
 
2 Choice and waiting times: theoretical model 
 
In this section we present a theoretical model that seeks to capture and distinguish the effects 
of two essential components of LPCP: increased choice for patients and an increase in the 
total supply of elective care. We start by holding total supply fixed to focus on the effects of 
choice.  Suppose there are two geographical areas. In the pre-choice regime, the population 
of each area is assigned to the single hospital in the area. The demand for elective care 
depends on local patient characteristics and the waiting time at the local hospital: 
( )i i ix D w=  (i=1,2). Each provider has fixed capacity Si. The market in each area clears:  
 
( ) 0i i iD w S− = ,      i = 1, 2       (1) 
 
yielding the waiting times in each area in the no choice era as: 
 
( ), 1/nci i i i iw w S w D′ ′= =  i = 1, 2      (2) 
 
The average waiting time across both areas is: 
 
 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1 2 2 1 2
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
nc D w w D w w S w S ww
D w D w S S
+ += =+ +      (3) 
 
When choice is introduced, patients in either area are allowed to go to either hospital. The 
market equilibrium condition is now: 
 
 1 2 1 2( ) ( ) 0D w D w S S+ − − =        (4) 
 
yielding the same equilibrium waiting time in each area of:  
 
 1 2( )
c cw w S S= +         (5) 
 
Comparison of (3) and (5) shows whether choice increases or decreases the average waiting 
time.  By assuming linear demand curves i i i ix a bw= −  it is possible to solve for the change 
in average waiting time as functions of the parameters ai, bi , Si  (i = 1, 2). It can be shown 
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that the mean waiting time will not be constant unless one makes highly restrictive 
assumptions about the relationships amongst the parameters.  
 
More generally, we can proceed by modelling choice as equivalent to the transfer of capacity 
from the area with low waiting time to the area with the high waiting time until waiting times 
are equalised. (The transfer can be thought of as requiring that some of the beds in the 
‘importing’ area can be used to treat patients from the ‘exporting’ area.) Thus, letting area 1 
be the high waiting time area and t be the amount of capacity transferred, the waiting times 
become:1  
 
 1 1 1 2 2 2( ), ( )w w S t w w S t= + = −       (6) 
 
and the mean wait is:  
 
1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 2 2
[ ( ( )) ] ( ) [ ( ( )) ] ( )( )
( ( )) ( ( ))
D w S t t w S t D w S t t w S tw t
D w S t D w S t
+ − + + − + −= + + −    
        1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( )S w S t S w S t
S S
+ + −= +        (7) 
 
tc is the amount of capacity that must be transferred to equalise waiting times and is defined 
by: 
 
 1 1 2 1 1 2( ) ( ) ( )
c c cw S t w S t w S S+ = − = +      (8) 
 
We can characterise the no choice regime by t = 0 the full (completely unrestricted) choice 
regime by t = tc and the effect of full choice relative to no choice on average waiting times is 
( ) (0)cw t w− . 
 
We require specific assumptions about functional forms and parameters in order to determine 
if full choice increases or reduces mean waiting times. But we can make some progress by 
examining the effect of a small increase in choice by differentiating ( )w t  with respect to t. 
 
Notice from (7) that the mean wait is the mean waiting list divided by the total supply: 
1 2( ) ( ) /[ ]w t L t S S= + . Since we assume initially that choice has no effect on total supply, 
the sign of the marginal effect of extra choice on the mean wait is the same as the sign of the 
effect of extra choice on the mean waiting list: 
 
1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2
( ) [( ) ] [( ) ] [ ] [ ]dL t S t w w S t w w D w w D w w
dt
′ ′ ′ ′= + + − − + = + − +  
          1 2
1 2
1 11 1w wε ε
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤= + − +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
      (9) 
where iε  is the elasticity of demand with respect to waiting time. 
 
                                                 
1. We assume implicitly here that patients in area 1 look only at the waiting time at hospital 1 in deciding 
whether to join the list at hospital 1. Thus they ignore the possibility of getting transferred to hospital 2.  
This seems reasonable for the LPCP where patients were offered choice only after they had been on the 
list at the exporting hospital for several months.  
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Notice that at t = tc, we would have w1 = w2 and a small restriction on choice (reduction in t) 
would increase the mean waiting time if and only if 1 2ε ε> . Thus, if demand is less elastic in 
area 1 and we restrict choice a little, the average waiting time will increase. 
 
If we assume that demand elasticities are equal 1 2ε ε ε= =  then the sign of (9) is 
determined by the sign of:  
 
 1 2( )(1 )w w ε ε− +         (10) 
 
Empirical studies (for example, Martin and Smith, 1999; Gravelle, Smith and Xavier, 2003) 
invariably show quite inelastic demand with respect to waiting time ( 10 −>> ε ) so that with 
equal demand elasticities in the two areas an increase in choice will reduce the average 
waiting time. 
 
So far we have assumed that total supply is not affected by the choice regime, and that there 
is merely a transfer between hospitals. But LPCP led to an increase in supply.  Suppose that 
the new supply n is available only in hospital 2 (the importer).  Then the waiting time at 
hospital 2 is now w1(S1 – t +n) and the mean wait is  
 
1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
( ) ( ) ( )( , ) S w S t S n w S t nw t n
S S n
+ + + − += + +     (11) 
 
which is decreasing in n provided demand at hospital 2 is inelastic (ε2 >  – 1).   
 
In fact, much of additional supply in the LPCP was provided at new Treatment Centres rather 
than importing hospitals.  To capture this type of new supply suppose all new supply is 
provided through Treatment Centres for which the average wait is w0. Then the mean wait is 
now 
1 1 1 2 2 2 0
1 2
( ) ( )( , ) S w S t n S w S t nww t n
S S n
+ + + − += + +  
 
which is decreasing in n provided that the waiting time at Treatment Centres is less than the 
weighted average wait in hospitals 1 and 2.2  Increases in n reduce the wait for patients at the 
exporting hospital and have no effect on the wait of those in the importing hospital.  
 
Resources devoted to different types of elective care can be varied by hospitals so that the 
change in incentives created by LPCP may also lead to changes in endogenous supply and 
hence waiting times. Although these possibilities complicate the theoretical modelling, they do 
not qualitatively affect the nature of the results (Gravelle, 2005).  
 
The implementation of the LPCP does not correspond exactly to this highly stylized 
representation.  In particular, it emphasizes the impact of patient choice on waiting times 
without considering the precise financial and other incentives in force in London hospitals, or 
factors other than waiting time (such as travel distance) that influence patient choice.  
However, the model does capture many of the essential features of a move towards greater 
patient choice amongst hospitals.  Reasonable assumptions about the parameter estimates 
suggest that, other things equal, the effect of the LPCP is that  
 
(a) on average for LPCP hospitals waiting times will fall; 
(b) waiting times will increase in importing hospitals; 
(c) waiting times will fall in exporting hospitals; 
(d) differences in waiting times between importing and exporting hospitals will fall; 
                                                 
2. Increasing n increases demand and supply at Treatment Centres by the same amount and so does 
not alter w0. The sign of /w n∂ ∂ is the sign of 1 2 1 1 1 2 0 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )S S n S w S S w S w S w′+ + + + − + . 
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3 Methods and data 
 
We use difference in difference (DID) methodology (Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000; 
Wooldridge, 2002) to identify the effects of the LPCP. We compare the change in 
ophthalmology waiting times for LPCP hospitals for the three years before (October 1999 to 
September 2002) and the one year after (October 2002 to September 2003) with the change 
in waiting times for hospitals in a comparator group over the same period.  
 
Our theoretical model (hypothesis (a)) suggests that choice leads to a reduction in waiting 
times averaged across importers and exporters.  Participation as an exporter or importer was 
voluntary and 6 out of 20 London hospitals did not join the LPCP. A comparison of waiting 
times averaged across importers and exporters against waiting times for hospitals outside 
London may therefore be biased by selection effects. A London hospital’s decision to take 
part in the LPCP is likely to have been influenced by unobservable factors affecting its 
expectation of its waiting times if it did not join.  Hence we test hypothesis (a) by testing for an 
effect of the LPCP on waiting times for all LPCP hospitals whether importers, exporters or 
other.  
 
We estimate  
3 3 3
0 1 2 3 4
1 1 1
iq i t t it q q t i t iq
t q t
w L D Z D L Dβ β β β β δ ε
= = =
= + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑     (12) 
where 
wiq      is waiting time for hospital i in quarter q 
Dt       is a year dummy for t = 1 (1999/00), 2 (2000/01), and 3 (2001/02).  The baseline year is 
2002/03. 
Li       is a dummy variable for LPCP hospitals where Li = 1 if a hospital is in LPCP and 0 
otherwise 
Zit      are observable factors affecting waiting times for hospital i in quarter t 
Dq       is a seasonal (quarter) dummy (q = 2,3,4) 
 
The year and seasonal dummies seek to control for all other unobserved temporal factors 
affecting waiting times. The LPCP main effect Li controls for all time invariant differences 
between LPCP hospitals and the control group. The interaction of the year and LPCP 
dummies identifies the change in waiting times from the base year for LPCP hospitals relative 
to control hospitals. The DID methodology assumes that all other temporal factors affecting 
waiting times have the same effects for LPCP hospitals and the control group. Thus we 
assume any changes over time that we do not control for affect all hospitals in the same way. 
 
The effect of the LPCP on LPCP hospitals is the difference in differences for year 4 (the year 
when LPCP was in effect) against a previous year.  Remembering that we used year 4 
(2002/03) as the “baseline year”, the difference in difference measure of year 4 against year 3 
is ( ) ( )3| , , 1 | , , 1, 1iq iq q i iq iq q iE w Z D L E w Z D L D⎡ ⎤= − = =⎣ ⎦           
                            ( ) ( )3| , , 0 | , , 0, 1iq iq q i iq iq q iE w Z D L E w Z D L D⎡ ⎤− = − = =⎣ ⎦  
                      ( ) ( )1 1 23 3 23 3β β β δ β δ= − + + − = −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦      (13) 
 
This is the effect of the LPCP relative to year 3 (October 2001 to September 2002) but we 
also measure it as the effect relative to year 2   (– δ2) and to year 1 (–δ1).   
 
Note that, as 6 out of 20 London hospitals did not participate in the LPCP, the estimated 
effect of the LPCP on the waiting times of all London hospitals including the non-participants 
is likely to understate its effect on waiting times averaged across importers and exporters.  
 
Our model in section 2 also generates predictions about the effect of the LPCP on waiting 
times at exporters, importers and others.  We predict that exporting hospitals will have 
reduced waiting times, importers will have increased waiting times and the others should not 
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be affected.    We test these predictions with an empirical model that distinguishes between 
the three types of hospital in London. We estimate  
 
 
3 3 3 3
0 1 2 3 4
1 1 1 1
O
iq k ik t iq q q kt ik t iq
k t q k M t
w L D Z D L Dβ β β β β δ ε
= = = = =
= + + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑∑    (14) 
 
where Lik is a dummy variable for hospital type k = M,X,O for importers, exporters and others.    
 
Again we test for an effect of the LPCP on LPCP hospitals of type k by using the DID 
coefficients (β3kt).   Thus for example we test hypothesis (b) on waiting times for importing 
hospitals by examining (– δMt), and hypothesis (c) for exporters by using (– δXt).  We test 
hypothesis (d) about the convergence of waiting times of exporters and importers by 
examining whether the improvement in exporters relative to importers (δMt – δXt) is positive. 
 
The first full year of data for LPCP in ophthalmology ran from October 2002 to September 
2003, and we concentrate on results for this specialty in the interests of space.  (Results for 
other specialties are presented elsewhere, Dawson et al (2004).)  
 
The waiting time measure is derived from quarterly administrative returns for ophthalmology 
for each hospital over a period of 4 years (16 quarters), starting from October 1999. We also 
have yearly hospital data (Zit) on expenditure, resource use, performance, activity, capacity 
measures, and staffing, including vacancy rates and salaries. 
 
Some hospitals within LPCP switched between the three (within-treatment) groups over the 
course of the LPCP treatment, and we take their status within LPCP as it stood in quarter 4 of 
the first year of LPCP (quarter 16).  
 
We used three types of comparator hospitals to estimate the effects of LPCP on LPCP 
hospitals: all hospitals in the rest of England; a matched control group from the rest of 
England; and all hospitals in four large metropolitan areas. The rest of England control group 
compares LPCP hospitals to a much larger sample of hospitals. This has the advantage of 
reducing standard errors on coefficient estimates in the regression analysis. However, its 
disadvantage is that the non-LPCP hospitals in the rest of England are very varied and so 
may have unobserved differences in the time trends of their waiting times, thereby violating 
the identifying assumption of the DID method.  
 
We therefore also matched LPCP hospitals with non-LPCP hospitals using propensity score 
matching in the hope that hospitals which were similar in terms of their observed 
characteristics would also have similar unobserved factors affecting their waiting time trends.  
Since the assignment of hospitals to the treatment (LPCP) and control (non-LPCP) groups is 
not random, the estimation of the treatment effect may be biased by the existence of 
confounding factors (Becker and Ichino, 2002). Propensity score matching matches treatment 
hospitals (LPCP) with non-treatment hospitals, chosen from the set of hospitals in the rest of 
England on the basis of observable characteristics, other than their waiting times, in the year 
before introduction of LPCP. The disadvantage of the approach is that – whilst statistically 
there is a strong match between LPCP and non-LPCP hospitals on their observable pre-
treatment characteristics – the control group is small, and coefficient estimates may therefore 
be less well defined.  
 
As a compromise between a large but unmatched comparator group and the small matched 
group, we also used hospitals in certain Metropolitan areas (West Yorkshire, Greater 
Manchester, Birmingham and the Black Country, and West Midlands South) as controls.  
 
For each of the above control groups we estimated DID models using three estimators: 
pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects or generalised estimation equation models 
(Liang & Zeger, 1986). We report all three sets of results. Robust standard errors were 
employed throughout. We tested for multi-collinearity using variance inflation factors for the 
covariates specified in the fitted model. Variables were dropped if there was evidence of 
multi-collinearity (Fox, 1997).  
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4 Results 
 
4.1 Effects of London Patient Choice Project on waiting times 
 
Table 1 has descriptive statistics for the mean inpatient waiting times in ophthalmology for the 
different groups of hospitals.  The mean waiting time across all treatment and control groups 
has fallen over the 4 periods. Exporters have higher waiting times than all other groups of 
hospitals, particularly in the first 3 years although there is a big decline in year 4. The ‘other’ 
group have consistently lower waiting times than any of the other groups within London over 
the 4 years. Waiting times for the rest of England group and the matched control group are 
similar. Mean waiting times in metropolitan areas are lower than for the other two control 
groups, and similar to the ‘other’ hospital group within London, particularly for the last 2 years 
of data. 
 
Table 1 also shows the coefficients of variation for all groups. Across all groups (except 
metropolitan areas) there has been a reduction in the coefficient of variation over the four 
year period: mean waiting times have become more similar within the groups.  
 
Figure 1 shows trends in average ophthalmology waiting times for (a) importing hospitals (b) 
exporting hospitals and (c) non-participating hospitals in London, with the start of the LPCP 
indicated by the vertical line in 2002.  (There was hiatus in data collection for one year in 
1997-98.)  The graph demonstrates prima facie evidence of a general downward trend in 
waiting times, and a convergence amongst London hospitals of all types.  However, in the 
absence of proper econometric modelling of control groups, such observational data cannot 
isolate the specific impact of LPCP.   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Waiting time in weeks for ophthalmology inpatients, June 1995-March 2004 
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Table 1: Inpatient mean waiting time in weeks in ophthalmology by hospital group by year 
 
Number of 
hospitals LPCP year 
Number of 
observation
s Mean Std Dev 
Coefficient 
of variation Variance Min Max 
Rest of 
England n=163 1 515 18.332 5.56 0.303 30.91 7 35 
  2 488 17.318 5.32 0.307 28.30 7 32 
  3 458 16.896 5.05 0.299 25.50 7 32 
  4 447 15.372 4.46 0.290 19.89 7 26 
LPCP n=20 1 72 16.982 5.84 0.344 34.11 9 27 
  2 76 18.397 5.85 0.318 34.22 9 31 
  3 78 17.438 5.87 0.337 34.46 7 29 
  4 76 14.746 3.77 0.256 14.21 9 27 
Importers n=4 1 16 16.254 4.63 0.285 21.44 9 23 
  2 16 16.082 4.31 0.268 18.58 11 24 
  3 16 13.347 3.12 0.234 9.73 10 19 
  4 16 11.322 2.06 0.182 4.24 9 15 
Exporters n=10 1 32 20.014 4.73 0.236 22.37 10 27 
  2 36 22.087 4.71 0.213 22.18 13 31 
  3 38 21.878 4.48 0.205 20.07 13 29 
  4 36 17.442 3.30 0.189 10.89 12 27 
Others n=6 1 24 13.426 5.88 0.438 34.57 9 26 
  2 24 14.404 4.91 0.341 24.11 9 25 
  3 24 13.136 3.63 0.276 13.18 7 23 
  4 24 12.983 2.07 0.159 4.28 9 17 
Matched 
control n=18 1 60 19.475 6.33 0.325 40.07 7 31 
  2 66 18.531 6.23 0.336 38.81 7 32 
  3 70 17.760 5.03 0.283 25.31 9 28 
  4 70 15.796 3.67 0.232 13.47 9 24 
Metropolitan 
areas n=26 1 52 15.898 4.37 0.275 19.13 7 23 
  2 62 15.050 4.20 0.279 17.60 8 23 
  3 74 13.730 3.71 0.270 13.77 7 21 
  4 80 12.144 3.48 0.287 12.09 8 24 
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Figure 2 plots the distribution for the mean waiting time variable over time for the LPCP group 
relative to each of the main comparator groups. The box shows the interquartile range from 
the 25th to 75th percentile, with the line in the middle of the box showing the median of the 
distribution of mean waiting times. The figure indicates a reduction in the median value of 
waiting times across all groups over time. While the median value of waiting time for 
metropolitan area hospitals has fallen, there has been less reduction in the distribution of 
mean waiting times. The most dramatic reduction in the dispersion of mean waiting times is 
within the LPCP group, underscoring the apparently important equity implications of the 
LPCP. 
 
Table 2 shows the regression results for the DID model in which we test whether there was a 
significant difference in the change in mean waiting times between years 3 and 4 in the 
overall treatment group (LPCP) relative to the three control groups (rest of England; matched 
control; metropolitan areas). For each group we have run the DID model using the three 
estimation procedures outlined. All are run with seasonal effects although these are not 
reported. 
 
The β1 coefficients indicate the overall difference in waiting times between LPCP hospitals 
and the control groups.  This is significant and negative relative to the rest of England and 
metropolitan area comparator groups when using OLS, and to the rest of England and 
matched control groups when using random effects. The size of the coefficients in these two 
control groups suggest that LPCP waiting times were between 2 and 3 weeks lower overall.  
 
The βt coefficients indicate the change in waiting times for the entire sample from year t to the 
base year. All three sets of results for all three comparator groups show significant reductions 
of around 3 to 5 weeks in year 4 relative to the other years.  
 
The δt coefficients give the interaction effects between LPCP membership and the year t 
effects. We can add the δkt coefficients to the β1 coefficients to obtain an estimate of waiting 
times in year t for each type of LPCP hospital.  In all the models the DID estimate for year 4 
against year 3 (–δ3) is modest, with estimates significant at the 10 percent level in only three 
of the models.   The modest measured impact may be because any effect of LPCP is likely to 
be on the exporters and importers only, and 6 out 20 LPCP hospitals were neither exporters 
nor importers.   
 
Table 3 reports the results from models that allow the differential responses for the three 
LPCP groups (eXporters, iMporters and Others) relative to the three comparator groups.  The 
β1M coefficients suggest importers had significantly lower waiting times overall compared to 
the rest of England and matched control groups. ‘Others’ also have significantly lower waiting 
times against these two comparator groups. Contrary to expectations, exporters do not have 
significantly higher waiting times than the control groups. As before, the positive β2t 
coefficients suggest a decline in waiting times in the final year relative to each of the earlier 
years across almost all specifications.  
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Figure 2: Distribution of mean waiting time in weeks for ophthalmology by year for LPCP Hospitals and the comparator groups Rest of England 
and Metropolitan areas 
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Table 2: Difference in difference estimates of effect of London Patient Choice Project on ophthalmology inpatient waiting times for all LPCP 
hospitals   
 Rest of England comparator Matched control Metropolitan areas comparator 
 OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects 
LPCP  (β1) -1.677  -3.826 -1.038  -3.270 1.822  -0.208 
 (3.24)***  (2.77)*** (1.59)  (2.38)** (2.89)***  (0.13) 
1999/00 (β21) 3.357 3.101 2.838 4.720 3.720 3.699 5.488 3.131 3.167 
 (10.45)*** (6.88)*** (6.65)*** (5.74)*** (2.41)** (2.81)*** (7.46)*** (2.83)*** (3.06)*** 
2000/01 (β22) 2.023 2.097 1.883 3.292 2.440 2.808 3.917 2.379 2.407 
 (6.42)*** (5.80)*** (5.35)*** (3.93)*** (1.98)* (2.41)** (6.09)*** (2.43)** (2.58)*** 
2001/02 (β22) 1.605 1.639 1.587 2.101 1.976 2.043 1.758 1.266 1.321 
 (5.14)*** (6.45)*** (6.41)*** (2.68)*** (2.50)** (2.76)*** (3.42)*** (2.37)** (2.61)*** 
DID 2002/03 – 1999/00(-δ1) -1.655 0.284 0.984 -2.455 -0.391 0.034 -2.125 0.364 0.525 
 (1.94)* (0.27) (0.98) (2.15)** (0.22) (0.02) (2.03)** (0.26) (0.38) 
DID 2002/03 – 2000/01(-δ2) 0.817 2.251 2.991 1.136 1.791 2.053 0.267 2.123 2.285 
 (0.98) (2.31)** (3.17)*** (0.20) (1.16) (1.38) (0.25) (1.60) (1.72)* 
DID 2002/03 – 2001/02(-δ3) 0.635 1.202 1.447 0.163 0.741 0.993 1.129 1.617 1.628 
 (0.83) (1.44) (1.86)* (0.16) (0.67) (0.93) (1.31) (1.71)* (1.79)* 
Constant (β0) 17.456 15.169 14.714 12.848 10.360 8.426 16.207 7.888 2.848 
 (10.96)*** (62.14)*** (5.02)*** (15.14)*** (3.02)*** (1.67)* (8.77)*** (1.58) (0.57) 
Observations 2047 2210 2167 540 536 568 570 614 610 
R-squared 0.14 0.79  0.22 0.75  0.31 0.77  
RESET 0.0003 0.130 0.158 0.0004 0.270 0.127 0.558 0.008 0.218 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
LPCP   - Dummy variable for LPCP hospitals, gives main LPCP effect 
1999/00 etc  - Dummy variable for 1999/00 etc year effects (1 to 3), baseline year is 2002/03  
DID 2002/03 – 1999/00 etc - Interaction of LPCP hospital dummy and year dummies 
Covariates used in the models: 
rci    - Reference Cost Index (Reference Cost dataset)  
teaching    - Dummy variable for teaching status based on hospital type (CIPFA) 
avbeds    - Average number of available beds (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)    
daycase_spell   - Number of daycase admissions per elective inpatient spell or daycase rate (Hospital Episodes Statistics) 
emerg_spell  - Number of emergency admissions per inpatient spell (Hospital Episodes Statistics) 
daycase_theatres   - The number of available daycase theatres (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)   
agnurspcx    - Proportion of non-NHS salary expenditure on agency nursing staff or bank nurses (CIPFA) 
opthalmology_consultpc  - Proportion of consultants in ophthalmology from the total number of hospital consultants (NHS Workforce Survey)  
bedph    - Number of available beds per head of population (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)    
dtc    - Dummy variable for whether a Hospital has a Diagnostic Treatment Centre (DTC) (Department of Health) 
prop_nurse   - Nursing staff WTEs as a proportion of total staff WTEs (Department of Health) 
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Table 3: Difference in difference estimates of effect of London Patient Choice Project on ophthalmology inpatient waiting times for Importers, 
Exporters and Other LPCP hospitals  
 Rest of England comparator Matched control Metropolitan areas comparator 
 OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects OLS Fixed effects
Random 
effects 
LPCP Importer (β1M) -4.824  -6.915 -4.389  -6.333 -0.911  -3.208 
 (7.69)***  (4.83)*** (6.32)***  (5.20)*** (1.48)  (1.90)* 
LPCP Exporter (β1X) 0.298  -1.750 0.606  -0.900 4.258  1.714 
 (0.47)  (1.01) (0.81)  (0.56) (6.34)***  (0.86) 
LPCP Other (β1O) -3.348  -4.797 -2.448  -4.043 0.199  -0.974 
 (5.74)***  (4.38)*** (3.79)***  (3.97)*** (0.26)  (0.78) 
1999/00 (β21) 3.254 2.890 2.850 4.430 3.694 3.697 -0.854 3.238 3.179 
 (10.13)*** (6.40)*** (6.68)*** (5.24)*** (2.41)** (2.80)*** (0.60) (2.90)*** (3.14)*** 
2000/01 (β22) 1.984 1.954 1.889 3.287 2.406 2.830 -0.130 2.728 2.397 
 (6.29)*** (5.37)*** (5.37)*** (3.96)*** (1.92)* (2.42)** (0.10) (2.90)*** (2.58)*** 
2001/02 (β22) 1.599 1.623 1.590 2.099 1.962 2.062 0.076 1.529 1.318 
 (5.13)*** (6.31)*** (6.43)*** (2.75)*** (2.48)** (2.79)*** (0.09) (3.03)*** (2.61)*** 
Importer DID 2002/03 – 1999/00 
(-δ1M)  -0.254 2.939 2.974 -0.529 1.419 1.952 -0.854 2.408 2.387 
 (0.18) (2.05)** (2.19)** (0.31) (0.65) (1.07) (0.60) (1.27) (1.36) 
Importer DID 2002/03 – 2000/01 
(-δ2M) 0.742 3.523 3.593 0.487 2.512 2.458 -0.130 2.686 2.972 
 (0.58) (2.73)*** (2.92)*** (0.28) (1.19) (1.45) (0.10) (1.62) (1.88)* 
Importer DID 2002/03 – 2001/02 
(-δ3M) -0.212 0.667 0.699 -0.370 0.061 0.141 0.076 0.770 0.950 
 (0.24) (0.83) (0.91) (0.30) (0.05) (0.13) (0.09) (0.83) (1.04) 
Exporter DID 2002/03 – 1999/00 
(-δ1X)  -1.018 2.052 2.012 -1.840 1.048 1.004 -2.092 1.857 1.710 
 (0.91) (2.51)** (2.57)*** (1.37) (0.63) (0.68) (1.73)* (1.38) (1.36) 
Exporter DID 2002/03 – 2000/01 
(-δ2X) 1.860 4.436 4.403 0.849 3.596 3.379 0.241 3.785 3.820 
 (1.76)* (3.61)*** (3.71)*** (0.65) (2.28)** (2.07)** (0.21) (2.51)** (2.59)** 
Exporter DID 2002/03 – 2001/02 
(-δ3X) 2.290 3.378 3.359 1.815 2.814 2.863 2.198 3.527 3.575 
 (2.49)** (2.98)*** (3.11)*** (1.55) (2.09)** (2.19)** (2.28)** (2.88)*** (3.08)*** 
Other DID 2002/03 – 1999/01 (-
δ1O) -3.309 -1.765 -1.731 -4.207 -3.417 -2.516 -4.414 -2.599 -2.567 
 (2.77)*** (0.85) (0.89) (2.87)*** (1.39) (1.06) (3.21)*** (1.13) (1.23) 
Other DID 2002/03 – 2000/01 (-
δ2O) -0.645 0.497 0.561 -2.190 -1.047 -0.225 -2.747 -1.139 -0.801 
 (0.58) (0.32) (0.38) (1.64) (0.54) (0.12) (2.17)** (0.65) (0.47) 
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Other DID 2002/03 – 2001/02 (-
δ3O)  -1.284 -1.020 -0.978 -2.046 -1.825 -1.380 -1.624 -1.324 -1.073 
 (1.37) (1.21) (1.22) (1.77)* (1.54) (1.26) (1.51) (1.44) (1.19) 
Constant (β0) 22.233 19.814 15.070 14.900 10.422 8.979 17.144 14.116 9.308 
 (11.02)*** (9.84)*** (5.31)*** (24.12)*** (3.25)*** (2.54)** (7.92)*** (23.10)*** (8.44)*** 
Observations 2047 2169 2167 540 536 568 572 612 612 
R-squared 0.18 0.79  0.34 0.77  0.44 0.78  
RESET 0.105 0.006 0.247 0.267 0.191 0.091 0.140 0.0001 0.901 
Convergence test for 2001/02 2.502 2.711 2.660 2.185 2.753 2.723 2.122 2.757 2.625 
 (2.10)** (2.02)** (2.07)** (1.65)* (1.87)* (2.10)** (2.00)** (2.03)** (2.02)** 
Convergence test for 2000/01 1.118 0.913 0.810 0.362 1.084 0.921 0.372 1.099 0.848 
 (0.71) (0.54) (0.50) (0.20) (0.55) (0.57) (0.25) (0.63) (0.51) 
Convergence test for 1999/00 -0.763 -0.887 -0.961 -1.312 -0.372 -0.948 -1.238 -0.551 -0.677 
 (0.43) (0.61) (0.70) (0.72) (0.21) (0.67) (0.77) (0.34) (0.45) 
 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
LPCP Importer   - Dummy variable for importing hospitals 
LPCP Exporter   - Dummy variable for exporter hospitals 
LPCP Other   - Dummy variable for other hospitals 
1999/00 etc   - Dummy variable for 1999/00 etc year effects (1 to 3), baseline year is 2002/03  
Importer DID 2002/03 –1999/00 etc.  - Interaction of importing hospital dummy and LPCP year dummies 
Exporter DID 2002/03 –1999/00 etc.  - Interaction of exporting hospital dummy and LPCP year dummies 
Other DID 2002/03 –1900/01 etc.  - Interaction of other Hospital dummy and LPCP year dummies 
Covariates used in the models: 
rci     - Reference Cost Index (Reference Cost dataset)  
teaching     - Dummy variable for teaching status based on hospital type (CIPFA) 
avbeds     - Average number of available beds (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)    
mortal_indx    - Standardised three-year average mortality index (Dr Foster)  
daycase_spell    - Number of daycase admissions per elective inpatient spell or daycase rate (Hospital Episodes Statistics) 
emerg_spell   - Number of emergency admissions per inpatient spell (Hospital Episodes Statistics) 
daycase_theatres    - The number of available daycase theatres (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)   
agnurspcx     - Proportion of non-NHS salary expenditure on agency nursing staff or bank nurses (CIPFA) 
bedph     - Number of available beds per head of population (Department of Health hospital activity statistics)    
opthalmop1pc   - Proportion of ophthalmology first outpatient attendances from total first outpatient attendances (CIPFA) 
opthalmology_consultpc   - Proportion of consultants in ophthalmology from the total number of hospital consultants (NHS Workforce Survey)  
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We test the overall DID in waiting times in year 4 versus year t for the three groups of LPCP 
hospitals relative to the comparator groups using (–δkt).  For year 4 against year 3 we find a 
consistent positive effect for exporting hospitals, statistically significant across eight of the 
nine models, confirming that they have lowered their waiting times in the LPCP year relative 
to the previous year. These results suggest exporting hospitals lowered their waiting times in 
the LPCP treatment year relative to the previous year by approximately 3 weeks.  In contrast, 
there is little evidence of any significant change amongst importers or other LPCP hospitals. 
 
We examined whether the improvement in exporters relative to importers δMt – δXt is positive 
in order to test hypothesis (d) that the LPCP led to a reduction in the dispersion of waiting 
times. This test is shown in the last three rows of Table 3, which confirms that – other things 
equal – exporters improved waiting times by about 2.5 weeks relative to importers in the 
project year.  Our earlier results suggest that such a decline has not been at the expense of 
patients at the hospitals now taking on the additional activity (importers).  
 
Figure 3 shows for each of the three groups of LPCP hospitals the difference between their 
mean waiting times in weeks and the mean for the Rest of England.  It shows a downward 
trend in waiting times from year 2 onwards for exporters. However, in all 4 years the mean 
waiting times for exporting hospitals is not significantly different from the rest of England 
comparator group. Importers and ‘others’ always have significantly lower waiting times than 
the rest of England group over all four periods. There is some reduction for importers in year 
4, and some increase for ‘others’ in year 4, relative to the rest of England, although neither of 
these changes is statistically significant.    
 
 
Figure 3: Mean waiting time in weeks for ophthalmology for LPCP groups relative to 
rest of England comparator group 
 
The overall effect is a convergence within London of inpatient waiting time for ophthalmology, 
with exporters moving closer to the other two London groups. The improved equity with 
respect to waiting times secured amongst London hospitals is the most marked achievement 
of LPCP over this period. 
 
Figure 4 shows analogous results using the Metropolitan comparator group. We again see a 
decline in waiting times for exporting hospitals from year 2 onwards. In years 2 and 3 mean 
waiting times for exporting hospitals were significantly higher than for metropolitan areas, 
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however in year 4 this is no longer the case and exporting hospitals are no longer significantly 
different. In all four years waiting times for importers and ‘others’ are not significantly different 
from waiting times for hospitals in metropolitan areas.  
 
Figure 4: Mean waiting time in weeks for ophthalmology for LPCP groups relative to 
metropolitan areas control group 
 
We searched for significant covariates variables in the database of hospital variables. In the 
interests of space, these are not shown in the tables.  Similar sets of control variables are 
significant across many of the models. Of particular interest is the dummy variable for 
treatment centres (dtc) in the OLS regression for metropolitan areas, suggesting that the 
availability of this new capacity may have contributed to a reduction in waiting times. Other 
control variables show that lower waiting times are associated with teaching hospitals, smaller 
hospitals with fewer beds, hospitals with a higher daycase surgery rates, hospitals that spend 
less on agency nurses, hospitals with higher mortality rates and hospitals with a higher 
proportion of nurses. Hospitals with a higher proportion of consultants in ophthalmology also 
have lower waiting times.   
 
We undertook a similar analysis for the specialities of orthopaedics and general surgery, but 
space precludes a full presentation (Dawson et al, 2004). The results for orthopaedics were 
similar to ophthalmology, indicating that, relative to control groups, LPCP succeeded in 
reducing mean waiting times in the treatment year. General surgery on the other hand 
showed no significant effect, and there may even have been an equity loss for the system, as 
there were increased waiting times for patients at hospitals dealing with the additional choice 
activity.  However, these results may be attributable to the fact that LPCP procedures account 
for only about 25% of activity in general surgery.   
 
 
5 Discussion 
 
This study has presented evidence on the impact of an ambitious scheme to introduce 
increased elements of patient choice into a public hospital system that has traditionally 
exhibited poor levels of responsiveness to patient needs.  Isolating the impact of the initiative 
is complicated by the plethora of other innovations being tested over the same period in order 
to meet the national government’s waiting time targets.  However, the experiment was 
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confined to London, and the DID methodology allows us to derive quite secure estimates of 
the specific LPCP effect. 
 
In ophthalmology we find a modest reduction in waiting times associated with the LPCP, a 
finding replicated in orthopaedics but not in general surgery (not presented here). More 
striking is the reduction in variation in waiting times within London.  Variations in the quality of 
health care received by individuals with identical needs have been a persistent policy concern 
in the UK, so the reduction in variations is undoubtedly a benefit of the scheme. This in itself 
would be considered an important improvement within the system, even if waiting times had 
not fallen.  Thus reductions in waiting times alongside a reduction in variation are two distinct 
and important trends in the data, along the lines predicted by our theory. 
 
It is infeasible to present here a full evaluation of the LPCP.  To do so would require 
consideration of unintended side-effects of the scheme, changes in patient satisfaction and 
outcomes, and scrutiny of the additional resources consumed by the LPCP.  Rather, in this 
paper we focus attention on a specific issue: the direct behavioural response of providers 
brought about by a scheme designed to bring down waiting times by promoting user choice. 
We find that providers have responded as intended and as predicted, although after adjusting 
econometrically for concurrent secular trends elsewhere, we find the results are perhaps not 
as marked as they might appear from naïve scrutiny of the data. The study therefore 
demonstrates the importance of deploying appropriate econometric methodology in 
evaluating such schemes. 
 
The LPCP ended in 2004, and the government is in the process of introducing patient choice 
for secondary care throughout England. However, the new universal scheme differs markedly 
from the LPCP, and does not seem to have been directly informed by the experiment. Choice 
will now be offered throughout England at the point of first referral to hospital by a general 
practitioner, not after the patient has been placed on the inpatient waiting list. Moreover, there 
will not be a strategic purchaser of surgical capacity, the role played by the LPCP team, and 
hospital funding will be directly tied to the patient’s choice, through a new system of case 
payments based on diagnosis-related groups.  
 
This new English choice scheme therefore highlights the importance of contextual detail when 
seeking to evaluate innovations in health care. It was the combination of related instruments 
that gave rise to the specific LPCP incentives, and evaluation was made feasible by the 
existence of a non-London comparison group. However, policy makers rarely implement 
initiatives with a view to evaluation, and the effectiveness of many health care reforms 
remains a matter for debate. Yet if we are to learn from the massive uncontrolled experiments 
visited on our health systems, there is a strong case for using more experimentation such as 
the LPCP, or even randomization, as an intrinsic part of the implementation process.  
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